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Abstract—Facebook, the most popular Online social network
is a virtual environment where users share information and are
in contact with friends. Apart from many useful aspects, there
is a large amount of personal and sensitive information publicly
available that is accessible to external entities/users. In this paper
we study the public exposure of Facebook profile attributes to
understand what type of attributes are considered more sensitive
by Facebook users in terms of privacy, and thus are rarely
disclosed, and which attributes are available in most Facebook
profiles. Furthermore, we also analyze the public exposure of
Facebook users by accounting the number of attributes that users
make publicly available on average. To complete our analysis we
have crawled the profile information of 479K randomly selected
Facebook users. Finally, in order to demonstrate the utility of
the publicly available information in Facebook profiles we show
in this paper three case studies. The first one carries out a
gender-based analysis to understand whether men or women
share more or less information. The second case study depicts
the age distribution of Facebook users. The last case study uses
data inferred from Facebook profiles to map the distribution of
worldwide population across cities according to its size.
I. INTRODUCTION
Facebook is the most popular On-line Social Network
(OSNs) with more than one billion subscribers. Users mainly
utilize Facebook to share their opinions, interests, personal
content like pictures with users who are connected to them. An
important element that Facebook incorporates is the possibility
of defining detailed profile where users provide information
about themselves. In Facebook we find more than 20 different
attributes that can be utilized in a user profile. Those attributes
include potentially sensitive information such as contact info,
birth date, current city, home town, employers, college, high
school, etc. Furthermore, together with personal details, Face-
book users can complete their profiles by expressing their
interests in different categories such as music, movies, books,
etc., which in many cases facilitates deriving sensitive infor-
mation from a user (e.g. personality characteristics, political
leanings). Depending on the person, their status and this
information’s social context, publicly disclosing this sort of
information could lead to some serious privacy issues. To
avoid or at least mitigate these problems, Facebook allows
each user to define a degree of privacy for different attributes
in the profile. That is, for each attribute, a Facebook user can
decide among several privacy options: (i) leaving an attribute
blank so that no one will get access to that information; (ii)
filling out an attribute and defining its privacy level as “only
me” meaning only the user has access to that information;
(iii) defining the attribute privacy level as “friends”; (iv)
defining the attribute privacy level as “friends of friends”;
(v) defining the attribute privacy level as “custom” and (vi)
defining the privacy level as “public” so that any user can
access that information. Base on the Facebook strategies by
default most of the attributes are publicly available except the
birthday, Political views, Religion and Contact Info that are
in the level of “only Friends”. For these attributes users can
change the privacy level to public or more private.
The information included in the profile of Facebook users
is precious for external users/entities and these have very
divergent objectives, from non-lucrative activities such as
research to lucrative ones, including marketing campaigns.
Given the privacy management provided by Facebook, external
entities can only access attributes that have been defined as
“public” by users. Therefore, an important question to answer
is what is the amount of public information that an external
user/entity can find in Facebook profiles. In other words, what
is the portion of Facebook users that publicly disclose (i.e.
indicate privacy level “public”) each of the profile attributes.
By answering this question for each attributes we will be able
to understand which type of information is considered more
sensitive by Facebook users, and to the contrary, what are the
attributes experiencing major public exposure.
Toward this end we have collected the public profiles of
479K randomly-selected Facebook users, and analyze 19 of the
profile’s attributes by computing the portion of the collected
users that publicly disclose each attribute in their profiles.
We divide the analyzed attributes into two groups: personal
and interest-based attributes. The former category refers to
attributes that contain personal life information about the user
(e.g. location, education, work history, etc). Interest-based
attributes, on the other hand reflect the tastes of Facebook
users, revealed by their preferences (e.g. in music, television,
sport teams, etc). The results will let us determine the attributes
that users consider more sensitive. Furthermore, we explore
the correlation degree among the different personal attributes.
That is, determining if a user disclosing a personal attribute A
has some relation to that user also publicly sharing a different
attribute B. In order to get a meaningful answer, in this paper
we correlate 9 personal attributes 2 by 2.
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Our attribute-based analysis tells us how much information
can be retrieved for a particular attribute, but it does not
contribute anything regarding the expected amount of infor-
mation that we can extract from a typical Facebook user.
Therefore, we seek to understand the public exposure habits of
Facebook users themselves. To that end we have defined a very
simple yet meaningful metric that accounts for the number of
attributes that are publicly disclosed in a Facebook profile,
and refer to it as the Degree of Public Exposure (DPE). The
DPE ranges from 0 for user profiles that do not have any
attribute publicly available, to 19 when a user has made all the
analyzed attributes available, including personal and interest-
based attributes. Hence, we can assign each of the 479K users
in our dataset a DPE value. Using this metric and our dataset
we are able to identify what type(s) of users present a higher
degree of public exposure.
Finally, in the last part of this paper, we define three simple
use cases to illustrate how some external entities can utilize the
information that is publicly accessible in Facebook. First, we
perform a gender-based division of different personal attributes
to discover whether men or women show a significant predis-
position to publicly disclose particular type of information.
Second, we depict the distribution of the ages of our 479K
Facebook users based on those users that publicly share their
ages. Third, we check the accuracy that could be achieved by
using Facebook users as an estimator for the distribution of
the world wide population in cities.
The main observations extracted from the paper are:
(i) Friend-list is the attribute with the largest public exposure
with almost 63% of users publicly sharing their contacts,
whereas a users’ age (i.e. Birth date attribute) rate as having
the highest privacy value for from Facebook users, since only
3% disclose this information.
(ii) There are strong correlations between Current City and
Home Town attributes. This may be because both attributes
provide a type of “location” information, and users revealing
one tend to also share the other. In addition, we found a
second high correlation between education (i.e. College) and
professional experience (i.e. Employers) attributes.
(iii) The average Facebook user makes more than four at-
tributes publicly available in their profiles.
(iv) Men show a larger public exposure than women for all
personal attributes except birth date. This exception is very
surprising given the widespread assumption that women tend
to hide their real age more than men.
(v) The age range most-represented, based on the publicly
available information, is 18-25. That range accounts for 1/2
of the users among those making their birth date publicly
available.
(vi) We show that Facebook data very accurately estimates
the portion of people that live in cities of more than 5
million (according to a recent United Nation report [1]). It also
provides an accurate estimation for the proportion of people
living in cities ranging between 500K-1M inhabitants, whereas
it has a 10% deviation for cities of less than 500K and for cities
with between 1M and 5M citizens.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents related work and section III describes our data
collection techniques as well as the attributes definition. Sec-
tion IV and V discuss the disclosure degree of the Facebook
profiles attributes and section VI shows the usage of profile’s
disclosed information by analyzing three attributes of the
profiles. Finally we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
We explore the prior efforts regarding to user privacy in
online social networks that establish the basis for our work.
In a concept similar to our study, Quercia et al. (2012) [2]
found a correlation with the degree of openness and gender,
using a dataset of 1323 profiles from the United States.
Our work has many distinctions from this study. Firstly, our
dataset is much larger and broader (479K profiles widely
distributed throughout the world compared to a little more
than 1K profiles exclusively from U.S.). Secondly, our data
was gathered directly from Facebook profiles, while Quercia
et al. used a form of questionnaire administered by a specific
Facebook application. Lastly, we study most of the available
attributes in the FB profiles, and for some of them we deeply
investigated the correlation between the attribute type and
profile characteristics. They also concluded that men tend
to make their profile information more publicly available. In
another work by these authors [3], they study the personality
characteristics of popular Facebook users.
Gross et al. in [4] studied the patterns of information rev-
elation in Facebook. They analyzed just around 4K Carnegie
Mellon University students’ profiles. They evaluate the amount
of information students disclose and their usage of the site’s
privacy settings.
In other work, Chang et al. [5] studied the privacy attitudes
of U.S. Facebook users of different ethnicities. Another U.S.-
based study [6] used a questionnaire and with considering
1,710 students’ profiles shows that women are more likely
to maintain a higher degree of profile privacy than men; and
that having a private profile is associated with a higher level
of online activity. The authors in [7] examined disclosure in
Facebook profiles looking at only 400 Facebook profiles.
In a study of the Facebook users’ profile attributes, authors
in [8] present a method to estimate the birth year of 1M
Facebook users in New York City, based on the information
available on their profiles, such as their friends. Authors in
[9] examined the possibility of using the attributes of users,
in combination with their social network graph, to predict the
attributes of another user in the network. Other similar work
[10] presents a study of Facebook profile attributes by analyz-
ing a dataset of 30,773 Facebook profiles. They were able to
determine which profile attributes are most likely to predict
friendship links. They explore how profile attributes relate to
the #Friends of a user’s profile. An investigation of Facebook
users’ privacy evolution in a dataset of a large sample of New
York City (NYC) Facebook users, was presented in [11]. That
study shows how the close/disclose status of profiles attributes
changed over time.
By considering the previous work, the study presented here
is a new effort in the arena of social networks; one that by
uses a large dataset of Facebook profiles to analyze the profile
information disclosure patterns.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ATTRIBUTES DEFINITION
We have developed an HTML crawler that is able to collect
publicly-available information from a Facebook user’s profile.
The crawler collects up to 19 attributes from each profile. It
must be noted that our tool respects the privacy of users since
we only collect information that users themselves decide to
share publicly. We run our crawler between March to June
2012 and captured the profile of 479k Facebook users ran-
domly selected throughout the world. For each user we store
up to 19 different attributes (only those publicly available).
We classify those attributes into two categories:
Personal attributes: Friend-list, Current City, Hometown,
Gender, Birthday, Employers, College and HighSchool.
Interest-based attributes: Music, Movie, Book, Television,
Games, Team, Sports, Athletes, Activities, Interests and In-
spired poeple.
The meaning of the personal attributes present are obvious
and self-contained. It worth mentioning that some of them such
as Employers, College, or HighSchool could include more than
one item. We need to note that in our analysis we insert an
“artificial” interest-based attribute, called Aggregate-Interests
which is a binary attribute, i.e. it is 1 if the user publicly shares
at least one item among all the interest-based attributes, and
0 otherwise. The Aggregate-Interests attribute lets us know
if a user shares any interests without taking into account the
separate categories.
Finally, in order to perform personal attribute correlations,
and to gain further insights into some of them, we have divided
our main dataset into several attribute-based groups. Basically,
a given group A includes all the users in our main dataset
that publicly disclose attribute A. For instance, from this point
onwards in the paper, when we mention the Gender group
we are referring to the group that includes all the users in
our dataset that make their gender available in their Facebook
profile.
IV. PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF FACEBOOK PROFILE
ATTRIBUTES
In this section we define the degree of publicly disclosed
information in FacebookWe first perform an attribute-based
analysis to study the portion of Facebook users that disclose
each attribute. Next, we study the correlation among pairs of
personal attributes. This analysis will provide useful insights
on whether some attributes are correlated and we will discuss
some potential reasons for such correlation.
A. Degree of attributes disclosure
We provide some global numbers that paint a global picture
of the amount of information (i.e. attributes) that Facebook
users make publicly available. To this end first of all we study
the default status of the attributes in Facebook. The study
TABLE I
PORTION OF USERS WITH PUBLICLY DISCLOSED PERSONAL AND
INTEREST-BASED ATTRIBUTES IN FACEBOOK PROFILES.
Attribute % Profiles accessible
Personal Friend-list 62.7
attributes CurrentCity 36.1
Hometown 34.6
Gender 53.5
Birthday 2.9
Employers 22.5
College 16.8
HighSchool 13.2
Interest-based Aggregate-Interest 48.4
attributes Music 41.0
Movie 28.3
Book 16.7
Television 31.8
Games 9.4
Team 8.5
Sports 2.3
Athletes 10.7
Activities 20.5
Interests 10.9
Inspire 1.9
shows that out of the 479k analyzed users, only 11.62% do not
share any attribute, 19.26% disclose a single attribute, while
the remanding users, 69.12%, have two or more attributes
in their profile that are publicly accessible. These values
give a first reference point to help understand that external
users/entities can retrieve an enormous amount of information
from Facebook profiles.
Our goal is to determine the level of privacy awareness
that Facebook users present with respect to the different
attributes. Table I shows the portion of users in our main
dataset that publicly disclose each of the studied attributes.
We first focus on personal attributes and then discuss interest-
based attributes.
a) Personal attributes: The friend-list appears as the
attribute with the greatest public exposure. Table I shows that
almost 63% of the users make their friend-list available. This
clearly indicates that FB users do not consider that exposing
their connections could lead to any privacy issue. At the other
extreme, the attribute with the lowest exposure is Birthday.
Less than 3% of the users reveal their age, which means that
users regard this attribute as highly private. Here it worth to
mention again that Birthday attribute is in the privacy level
of “only Friends” by default in Facebook and this 3% of
users they changed this level to publicly available. Also, 1/2
of the users share their gender. A bit less, around 35% of
users, make their current city and their home town available
publicly. This implies that users consider personal location
information to be more sensitive than the information related
to their contacts, but much less sensitive than their age. In
addition, users seem to be more concerned about privacy issues
linked to disclosing their job information since a little less
than 1/4 of them publicly list their employers. We close the
analysis of personal attributes by evaluating those related to
education, where 17% and 13% of users publicly share their
college and High School. Education-related attributes are thus
the next-most private attributes after age. In summary, we can
list the attributes in terms of public exposure (from more to
TABLE II
ATTRIBUTES CORRELATION. EACH VALUE IN THE TABLE REFERS TO THE PORTION OF USERS BELONGING TO THE GROUP INDICATED IN THE COLUMN
THAT DISCLOSE THE ATTRIBUTE INDICATED BY THE ROW.
Attribute All Friend-list CurrentCity Hometown Gender Age (Birthday) Job (Employers) College HighSchool
Friend-list 62.7 100 79.6 79.3 64.8 72.5 82.8 83 87
CurrentCity 36.1 45.9 100 74 42 56.2 55.4 59.4 57
Hometown 34.6 43.7 71 100 35.7 58.2 55.3 54.2 50.8
Gender 53.5 55.3 61.7 55.2 100 58.8 55.7 79.9 86
Birthday 2.9 3.4 4.6 4.9 3.2 100 5 4.9 4.2
Employers 22.5 29.7 34.5 35.9 23.4 38 100 59 53
College 16.8 22.2 27.6 26.3 25 28 43.8 100 64.6
HighSchool 13.2 18.3 20.8 19.3 21.2 18.7 31.1 50.7 100
less exposure) as follows: friend-list, gender, job, education,
and age.
b) Interest-based attributes: Table I shows that almost
1/2 the users share at least one interest within the interests-
based attributes, which means that Facebook users are not
very concerned about the potential privacy implications that
could be derived from sharing their interests. These attributes
are initially less sensitive than personal attributes in terms of
privacy. However, in some cases a particular interest of a user
regarding some controversial issue could potentially lead to
privacy issues. Looking at the results in the table we observe
that the more popular categories are music (41%), Television
(32%) and Movies (28.3%). It is interesting that almost all
users that share an interest (48%) are actually sharing Music
(41%). In contrast very few users share information in relation
to their sports interest and as to what inspires them, just 2.3%
and 1.9% respectively. The remaining interest-based attributes
are made available by 10%-20% users. Finally, it is worth to
mention that personal attributes such as Friendlist, CurrentCity,
Hometown or Gender are more accessible than users’ interests.
B. Correlation of Facebook Attributes
We now turn our attention to the different groups that
include all the users that disclosed a particular attribute (e.g.
CurrentCity), and how they correlate with the remaining
personal attributes. Table II shows the portion of users from
a given group (columns) that share one of the remaining
attributes (rows). For instance, the value crossing Current City
column with Friend-list row means that 79.6% of the users in
the CurrentCity group (i.e. those users from our dataset with
their CurrentCity attribute available) also disclose their Friend-
list. In addition, table II includes the results obtained from our
main dataset, referred to as All group (the first column in the
table), for comparison purposes.
First of all we observe that all the analyzed groups present
a larger percentage for their available attributes than in All
group, which implies that users that share one personal at-
tribute will likely share some other attributes. This assumption
is supported by the observation that 2/3 of Facebook users
disclose more than one attribute, as previously reported in
this section. It is especially noteworthy that most of the users
(71%) disclosing their CurrentCity also make public their
Hometown, and close to 74% of users that share their Home-
town attribute also disclose their CurrentCity. This indicate
that Facebook users relate these two attributes together, and in
case they share the place where they currently live, they also
disclose the place where they were born. In fact, these two
parameters are the only ones that directly provides a physical
location and it is clear that most Facebook users providing
location information tend to share both of these indicators.
Therefore, we can conclude that CurrentCity and Hometown
attributes are highly correlated since 3/4 of users disclosing
one of these attributes will also share the other one.
We also find a significant correlation when we relate the
employment and the education attributes. The users composing
the Employment group tend to also share some educational
information. In particular, 44% of the users that make their
job information available also show their College, and 31%
identify their High School. This is also validated in the
other direction as 59% and 53% of users in the College
and HighSchool groups, respectively, made their employer
available. In addition, as we would expect, the two education
attributes are highly correlated with each other. In contrast,
user groups that are not related to education or employment
information show a much lower correlation to these attributes,
always below 38%, 28% and 21% for Employment, College
and HighSchool, respectively. Furthermore, the high number
of users (44%) disclosing their College within the Employers
is significant even though 44% reflects less than half of all,
that figure is quite high given that a large number of users in
Facebook that cannot share their college because they simply
never attended (or did not graduate). Then, that 44% is actually
a very relevant number that roughly demonstrates that whoever
indicates their employer (or employment status) in Facebook
and has obtained a University degree wants to make it public.
This hypothesis is validated by the fact that only 31% users
in the Employers group share its HighSchool, and obviously
there are more users in the Employers group who went to
the High School than the ones who went to the University.
Previous statement is validated by the fact that 65% of users
in HighSchool group also report their College, whereas this
portion is reduced to 50% for those users in College group
that also report their HighSchool information. Therefore, we
can extract two main conclusions from the correlation analysis
between education and employment: (i) These two attributes
are clearly correlated in Facebook, and (ii) an important
fraction of users in Facebook understand that disclose the
University they attended does not imply any privacy issue,
instead they seem to believe it provides them with a good
TABLE III
MEDIAN AND MEAN OF DPE METRIC
Attribute Median Mean
All 3 4.27
Friend-list 5 5.61
Likes-list 7 7.11
CurrentCity 7 7.18
Hometown 7 7.35
Gender 4 5.26
Birthday 7 7.60
Employers 7 7.26
College 8 7.95
HighSchool 8 8.02
reputation.
In the Gender group we do not find any strong correlations,
only very weak correlations with CurrentCity (42%), Home-
town (36%) and Employers (23%) compared to the correlations
of the rest of the groups with these attributes. This would
suggest that users sharing their gender have strong privacy
concerns with respect to their location and employment infor-
mation.
In a nutshell, we have found strong correlations between:
(i) the CurrentCity and Hometown attributes, and (ii) the
education attributes, College and HighSchool, between each
other and with the Employment attribute. We believe that the
first correlation is because that users roughly perceive both
parameters as location information, so if they do not have
privacy concerns with one, they also do not have an issue
with the other. Our hypothesis for the second correlation is
that users, with anyone preparing a resume, find that education
and employment attributes complement each other.
V. PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF FACEBOOK USERS
To this point, we have performed an attribute-based anal-
ysis that has allowed us to understand which attributes are
more privacy-sensitive for Facebook users, and to identify the
correlation that exists (or not) among the different attributes.
However, this analysis did not account for the public exposure
of Facebook users. Towards this end we need to perform
a user-based analysis. Instead of taking one attribute and
counting how many users share it, we now need to look at
individual users and determine how many attributes (among
all those possible ones) she is disclosing. For that we take into
account all 19 attributes (Personal + Interest-based attributes).
We define a simple but functional metric named as Degree of
Public Exposure (DPE), which ranges from 0 to 19. Basically,
we go through the 19 parameters and whenever one can be
accessed we sum +1 to the DPE value for that user. By defining
this metric we are able to easily compare the level of profile’s
attribute openness without considering any kind of difference
between the attributes.
Table III shows the median and average value of the DPE
metric for our main dataset, as well as each of the previous
attribute-based groups, while Figure 1 provides further details
of the DPE distribution for the different groups by means
of a box plot graph that shows the 25th, 50th (median) and
75th percentiles. If we first consider the results for All group,
All Friendlist Currentcity Hometown Gender Age Job College HighSchool
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Fig. 1. Box plot of DPE for categories
we extract that a typical Facebook user presents an average
DPE of 4.27. The remaining groups (except for Friend-list
and Gender) show an average DPE higher than 7. This means
that users in these groups publicly disclose more than seven
attributes. It is worth noting that the users with a higher public
exposure are those ones that share their education information,
i.e users in College and HighSchool groups, which present an
average DPE of 7.95 and 8.02, respectively. If we analyze
the results shown in Figure 1, we can observe that all the
groups except All, Friend-list and Gender present a DPE 75th
percentile ≥10. This means that there are a relevant portion of
users that disclose more than 10 attributes. Therefore, those
users may be very attractive for external entities since they
have a quite complete information regarding them.
In a nutshell, our results demonstrate that anyone can find
substantial personal information from Facebook profiles since
it is publicly available. In particular, our results suggest that
if an entity wants to maximize the amount of information (i.e.
attributes) retrieved from Facebook profiles, she should target
users disclosing their education information.
VI. EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC FACEBOOK INFORMATION
USAGE
In this section we show three examples of how the informa-
tion available in Facebook can be used for different purposes.
A. Gender attribute: Men vs. Women public exposure
In each attribute-based group we found users that provide
their gender information and study which portion of them
are males and which portion females. Table IV shows the
percentage of users for each gender and group. Male is the
dominant gender for all the attributes except Birthday. This
seems to indicate that generally men are less concerned about
privacy issues than women, however the difference for most
of the parameters is small, and never goes above 11 percent-
age points. The higher differences occur for Employers and
HighSchool attributes. Finally, it is somewhat surprising that
women share their age information slightly more frequently
than men, which contradicts the “cultural” assumption that
women tend to hide their age more often than men.
We can find many reports that explore gender differences
in different disciplines like sociology and psychology such
TABLE IV
GENDER ANALYSIS PER CATEGORIES OF ATTRIBUTES
attributes’ categories %Male %Female
All 51.33 48.67
Friend-list 53.99 46.01
CurrentCity 52.81 47.19
Hometown 54.05 45.95
Gender 51.33 48.67
Birthday 49.23 50.77
Employers 55.23 44.77
College 53.30 46.70
HighSchool 55.89 44.11
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Fig. 2. %Profiles in different age range
as [12], etc, which in many cases has a large diffusion
even reaching general media. This example demonstrates that
the publicly available information in Facebook is a potential
source of information for these types of studies.
B. Age distribution analysis
Analyzing the distribution of ages among those few users
(i.e. 2.9% of the 479K) that publicly share their birth date
reveals some unexpected results. Figure 2 shows the portion
of users in our dataset belonging to each age from 13 to 107
(Facebook does not allow accounts to be opened for users
younger than 13). Surprisingly, we found very few users ≤18
years old, and we did not find any Facebook rule that penalizes
the disclosure of birthdays for users less than 18 years old. The
ages in the interval of 19-28 contain more than 50% of the
users revealing their age, with 21 and 22 the most represented
ages containing more than 8% of the users each one. From 28
years upwards we found an exponential decrement, in some
few cases reaching ages above 100. Particularly, we observe
that almost 0.5% users report an age of 107 (indicating 1905
as their birthday year, which at the time we collected the data
was the oldest year allowed by Facebook). It is very likely
that these are fake ages introduced by users who do not want
to provide their real age.
In order to provide aggregate numbers we have classified
users into 5 different ages groups.Table V reports the portion
of users included in each of these categories. The results
reveal that Teenagers very rarely (0.85%) disclose publicly
their age, which was totally unexpected statistic. In contrast, as
the results confirmed our expectation that Senior users, which
are the ones less representative in OSNs like Facebook, would
present a low weight in the Birthday group. Therefore, the
TABLE V
AGE OF USERS WITH DISCLOSED BIRTHDAY AND THE GENDER
DISTRIBUTION IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF AGE
Age category %Users in Birthday group %Female %Male
Teenagers (≤ 18) 0,85 62,67 37,33
Post-Teenagers (19 - 25) 48,29 54,83 45,17
Young (26 - 30) 27,22 48,10 51,90
Mature (31 - 50) 19,71 45,37 54,63
Senior 3,93 37,54 62,46
big majority of users sharing their age belongs to he interval
18-50. In particular, Post-Teenagers between 18 and 25 years
old represent 1/2 of the users sharing their birthday, followed
by Young that accounts 1/4 of the users, and Mature group
comprising 1/5 of the users from Birthday group.
The results in the previous section revealed that women
share their age a bit more often than men, and we want to
check whether this is constant across different age categories.
Table V shows for each age category the portion of users
whose gender is male or female. In the case of Teenage women
expose their age much more than men. In the case of post-
teenagers we find 10% more women than men among the
users disclosing their age. The observed tendency changes
for young people between 26-30 years old where we find
slightly more men sharing their age. This change of tendency
is confirmed in the Mature and Senior categories where there
are 10% and 25% more men with open ages as compared
to women, respectively. In summary, we can conclude that
there is a clear trend, the younger the age group the larger the
portion of women disclosing their age is as compared to men,
and the other way around, the older the age group the more
the portion of men disclosing their age.
As it happened for the gender analysis, there are other
disciplines that use age groups to perform different types
of analysis. We have demonstrated that Facebook allows
researchers to easily identify users of particular ages who also
have other personal and interest-based attributes accessible.
C. CurrentCity population analysis
In this section we aim to validate the accuracy of a small
sample of Facebook to compute the distribution of worldwide
population across cities according to their size. For this use
case we need to perform a more complex analysis than in
the previous use cases where the results were directly derived
from our database.
We found 8,473 different cities in the CurrentCity attribute
inside our dataset. We used debepedia [13] (a crowdsourcing
effort to extract structured information for Wikipedia) in order
to retrieve the population associated to those cities. We were
able to identify population for 1,840 cities that aggregately
include 173,026 profile out of the users with open CurrentCity
attribute our database. We classify these cities into six cate-
gories according to their population. For each category we
have extracted the portion of FB profiles (corresponding to
those cities) belonging to each class. Furthermore, we’ve used
official statistics reported by the United Nations (UN) in its
2011 World Urbanization Prospects report [1] (see page 25).
TABLE VI
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF FACEBOOK (#PROFILES) AND WORLD
(#INHABITANTS) IN DIFFERENT CITY SIZE CLASS
City Size Class (#Inhabitants) %Profiles (FB) %Inhabitants (UN)[1]
< 1K 0.14
1K - 10K 3.60
10K - 100K 18.50
100K - 500K 18.39 50.9 (<500k)
500K - 1M 8.78 10.10
1M -5M 33.04 21.30
> 5M 17.55 17.07
Unfortunately, this report only includes granularity for cities
with more than 500k citizens. Table VI collects the results for
the FB and the UN report.
Facebook results reveal that less than 0.2% of users live in
small villages with less than 1K inhabitants. Our hypothesis
for this result is that people living in such small villages
is usually senior people (>50), which, as demonstrated in
section VI-B, is very low population in Facebook. Therefore,
we believe this data may not reflect the reality. Larger villages
up to 10K citizens are reported by 3.6% of users. Again we
think this data is biased by the same reason explained before.
Small towns going from 10K to 100K citizens and big towns
between 100k-500K inhabitants show the same portion of
profiles, roughly 18.5% each of them, so 37% both categories
together. We found almost 9% of Facebook users in cities from
0.5M to 1M citizens. Finally, cities above 1M users include
more than 1/2 users, which are divided as follows. One-third of
Facebook users report that they live in cities with a population
between 1M and 5M, and 17.5% of the users live in very big
cities with more than 5M.
Here we compare the Facebook results to the UN data in
order to check the accuracy of a small Facebook sample (i.e.
users in our dataset belonging to those 1,840 cities for which
we were able to identify their population) to estimate the
worldwide population distribution across cities according to
their size. First of all, our data is able to very accurately esti-
mate the portion of worldwide population in cities with more
than 5M citizens. Furthermore, we also found a quite accurate
estimation of the population in cities whose population ranges
between 500k and 1M, since there is a discrepancy a bit higher
than 1%. In contrast, we found an important discrepancy for
the case of cities between 1M-5M citizens and towns whose
population is less than 500k. In the former case our data assign
33% of Facebook users to those cities, while UN data only
reports 21%, a 12 percentage point difference. This is aligned
to the 11 percentage point difference for cities with less than
500k citizens, since our data predicts 40% and UN data 51%.
We believe that part of this deviation is due to the small
amount of users our data reports for villages below 10K users
(less than 4%), since probably this portion is considerably
larger in reality, but we believe people on those villages shows
a much lower penetration in the use of technology (including
OSNs) and thus Facebook results are biased.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper with the goal of understanding the degree
of Facebook profile’s informartion disclosure, we study the
privacy status of Facebook profiles by analyzing the pro-
file’s attributes disclosure degree in a dataset including 479K
Facebook profiles publicly available information that we have
crawled from March to June 2012. The analysis of this
data reveals the following main insights about the disclosed
information in Facebook profiles. (i) Friend-list is the attribute
with the largest public exposure, whereas Birthday attribute is
the one showing major privacy concerns from Facebook users.
(ii) We find strong correlations between Current City and
Home Town attributes as well as (i.e. College and HighSchool)
and professional (i.e. Employers) attributes. (iii) In average
Facebook users make more than 4 attributes publicly available
in their profiles. (iv) Men show a larger public exposure as
compared to women for all personal attributes except birthday.
(v) The more representative age range based on the public
available information is 18-25 that accounts for 1/2 of the users
among those ones making its Birthday publicly available. (vi)
We show that Facebook accurately estimates the portion of
people leaving in different class of cities.
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